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strict liability the owner will still be open to a liability judgment without
adequate insurance protection. It remains for the courts to resolve the
problem with a clear and precise pronouncement.
SANFORD N. REINHARD
LIBEL-ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE OF A COUNTY
EXECUTIVE OFFICIAL
Defendant, County Manager of Metropolitan Dade County, dis-
missed the sheriff from his job. The manager explained his reasons for
the dismissal in a written communication delivered to each of the in-
dividual members of the Dade County Commission. The former sheriff,
alleging that the publication defamed him, brought action for libel
against the county manager. The defendant's motion to dismiss was
granted in the circuit court on the grounds that the defendant had, as
a matter of law, an absolute privilege to publish the alleged libelous
matter. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that exec-
utive officials of county government are only qualifiedly privileged as
to defamatory publications made in connection with their office.' On
certiorari2 to the Supreme Court of Florida, held, reversed: executive
officials of government are absolutely privileged as to defamatory pub-
lications made in connection with the duties and responsibilities of their
office. McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1966).
The tort action for libel affords the individual a means to recover
damages for injury done to his reputation.' Privilege is a defense to the
action. Privilege may be absolute or it may be qualified.4 The proper
assertion of the defense of absolute privilege, when its existence is evi-
dent on the face of the answer, is sufficient to cause the suit to be dis-
missed as a matter of law." A qualified privilege, on the other hand, will
be lost upon a showing by the plaintiff that the defamatory statement
was uttered with malice.' However, where there is an absolute privilege,
the defamer is shielded from the threat of civil liability, regardless of
malice.7
Absolute privilege was developed to facilitate governmental func-
1. Kelly v. McNayr, 175 So.2d 568 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
2. Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court of Florida as a matter of public in-
terest.
3. Note, Developments in the Law of Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 875 (1956).
4. The qualified privilege is sometimes termed "conditional."
5. Supra note 1.
6. Gray v. Mossman, 88 Conn. 247, 90 Ad. 938 (1914); Raymond v. Croll, 233 Mich.
268, 206 N.W. 556 (1925).
7. See, e.g., Glass v. Ickes, 117 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
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tions at the legislative' and judicial levels.' The United States Constitu-
tion specifically protects members of the Congress from civil actions for
defamatory statements made during congressional sessions. ° The par-
ticipants in judicial proceedings, at all levels," are clothed with immu-
nity from civil action for libel as long as the published statements are
relevant to the inquiry.
2
The earliest application of absolute privilege to the executive branch
of government occurred in England, and was first extended to members
of the executive hierarchy of cabinet rank.'" Historically, those who have
had their reputation injured have attacked executive public officials hold-
ing office at all levels of government for alleged irresponsible and malicious
publications. In the United States, at the federal level, the Supreme Court
first faced such an allegation in the celebrated case of Spalding v. Vilas, 4
which concerned the Postmaster General of the United States. In Spal-
ding, the Court granted the absolute privilege to a high ranking member
of the executive branch of government; thus it recognized the inade-
quacy of a qualified privilege by concluding that "[I]t would seriously
cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as en-
trusted to the executive branch of the government .... 5
In an interesting series of cases dealing with accusations of defama-
tion by federal officials, the doctrine of absolute privilege has been
clearly defined as an immunity that attaches at all policy-making levels
of the federal employment structure. 6 The judicial extension of the grant
of absolute privilege to subordinate employees in the executive depart-
ment was accomplished in Barr v. Matteo," which dealt the death blow
to high rank as the major test on the federal level. Speaking for a divided
court,18 Harlan, J. said:
We do not think that the principle announced in Vilas can
properly be restricted to executive officers of cabinet rank ....
The privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but
an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective func-
8. Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 COLUM. L. REv.
463, 474 (1909).
9. See infra note 10.
10. U.S. CoNss., art. 1, § 6 provides that "for any Speech or Debate in either House,
they shall not be questioned in any other Place."
11. Rammage v. Kendall, 168 Ky. 26, 181 S.W. 631 (1916).
12. See, e.g., Hardtner v. Saloum, 148 Miss. 346, 114 So. 621 (1927).
13. Chatterton v. Sec. of State for India in Council, [1895] 2 Q.B. 189 (CA.).
14. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
15. Id. at 498.
16. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (acting director of the office of Rent
Stabilization); Glass v. Ickes, 117 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (Cabinet Officer); Smith v.
O'Brien, 88 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (Member of the Federal Tariff Commission); Miles
v. McGrath, 4 F. Supp. 603 (D. Md. 1933) (Naval Officer).
17. Supra note 16.
18. The decision in Barr was S to 4.
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tioning of government .... It is not the title of his office but
the duties with which the particular officer . . . is entrusted.
... which must provide the guide .... 19
Absolute privilege, as evolved in the federal decisions, has been
grounded upon the overriding demands of public interest, which requires
that public officials be free from the fear and expense of litigation while
they are administering the public trust.2"
In order for a federal executive employee to avail himself of the
defense of absolute privilege, the subject matter of the suit must be
"more or less connected" with the scope of executive authority,21 or
within the "outer perimeter" of the line of duty of the official,22 or
related to matters committed to him for determination. 8
Federal employees are uniquely under federal protection. The Su-
preme Court in Howard v. Lyons24 held that federal employees must be
"judged by federal standards to be formulated by the courts in the ab-
sence of legislative action by Congress. 25 The determination of whether
absolute privilege is available to federal employees is not to be left to
the "vagaries of the laws of the several states. '26 The result of this deci-
sion has been to create a body of federal common law applicable to fed-
eral employees who are sued in either a federal or state court. This law
is to be applied even though the state law varies substantially from the
federal position.2
With the advent of the Spalding decision,28 many states groped for
a position to take with regard to state executive officials. Several states
29
19. Supra note 16, at 572.
20. For a brilliant analysis by Learned Hand, J. of many of the policy considerations
involved, see Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
21. Spalding v. Vilas, supra note 14.
22. Preble v. Johnson, 275 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1960).
23. Barr v. Matteo, supra note 16.
24. 360 U.S. 593 (1959).
25. Id. at 597. The commitment of the Supreme Court to absolute privilege for federal
employees has imposed a peculiar problem on those state courts that follow the doctrine of
qualified privilege, insofar as the federal common law must be applied to federal officers
sued in state courts. Carr v. Watkins, infra note 27, illustrates the difficulty. In that case
there were three defendants. One was a federal employee, and two were county officials.
The state court in Maryland applied the federal rule of absolute privilege to the federal
employee and limited the county employees to the Maryland rule of qualified privilege. It
appears to be a juris-prudential absurdity when one court must apply two inconsistent
standards to substantially the same facts, and the only significant measure of liability de-
pends upon whether the employer is the federal or the state government.
26. Ibid.
27. Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 177 A.2d 841 (1962). It is noteworthy that the pro-
tection of absolute privilege of federal employees has been extended to other tort liabilities.
See, e.g., Gregoire v. Biddie, supra note 20 (suit for false imprisonment against Attorney
General and subordinate officials); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd per
curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927) (suit for malicious prosecution against Special Ass't to the At-
torney General).
28. Supra note 14.
29. CAL. Civ. CODE § 47(1)(2) (1961); IowA CODE AxNo. ch. 659.1 n.55 (1946);
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enacted statutes which provided executive officials with a privilege in
an action for defamation for any publication made "in the proper dis-
charge of an official duty."80 Several of the state courts that have had
occasion to consider the protection afforded by the statutory privilege
have construed the privilege to be absolute."'
It appears that the greater number of states that have ruled upon
the extent of the privilege for state executive officials, whether or not
under a statutory authority, have decided that an absolute privilege is
available. 2 The early cases, however, adhered to the restricted view
that the absolute privilege, as applied to the executive functionary, must
be limited to an "act of state." ' After Spalding,8 4 many states liberal-
ized this view by including any publication "more or less connected"
with the official duty of executive officials in state government, 5 and
even prior to Barr, appeared to reject high rank as a requirement for
invoking the privilege.86
MONT. REv. CODES § 64-208 (1947); No. DAK. CENTURY CODE vol. 3-14-02-05 (1947);
OKLA. STAT. ANo. ch. 25-12 § 1443 (1951); UTAH CA. 45-2-3 (1953).
30. Typical statute: OxIcA. STAT. ANNo. ch. 25-12 § 1443 (1951):
A privileged publication or communication is one made:
First. In any legislative or judicial proceeding or any proceeding authorized
by law;
Second. In the proper discharge of an official duty; ...
31. Kelly v. Daro, 47 Cal.2d 418, 118 P.2d 37 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1941). Construed §
47(1) (2) of CAL. CIv. CODE as giving rise to an absolute privilege, where the libel occurred
during legislative investigative proceedings. Sanford v. Howard, 185 Okla. 660, 95 P.2d 644
(1939), construed 12 OKLA. ST. ANN. § 1443 (1951) and held remarks by University Presi-
dent at meeting of Board of Regents concerning the plaintiff, a school employee, as abso-
lutely privileged. Carter v. Jackson, 10 Utah 2d 284, 351 P.2d 957 (1960) construed § (2)
of U.C.A. 45-2-3 as covering with absolute privilege statements pertinent to any meeting of
a city council authorized by law.
32. See, e.g., infra notes 37 through 46. See also, Green, The Right to Communicate,
35 N.Y.U.L. REy. 903, 908 (1960).
Except for some jurisdictions in which minor officials may still be held liable for
malicious statements if the victim can successfully prove their malicious quality,
the immunity of officials is complete.
33. Chatterton v. Sec. of State for India in Council, supra note 13. The term "act of
state" apparently was first used in this case and adopted by American courts. The court
stated, "the document complained of is an act of state," and therefore, absolutely privi-
leged. See also, Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23, 81 At]. 1013 (1911) (dictum); Whitcomb
v. Hearst Corp., 329 Mass. 193, 107 N.E.2d 295 (1952) (court held the "Stars & Stripes"
was not an "act of state" or an "official communication of the government."); Bigelow v.
Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 37 N.E.2d 584 (1941) (defines an act of state as "official acts of
the chief executive officers of state or nation").
34. Spalding v. Vilas, supra note 14.
35. Green v. Hoiriis, 103 So.2d 226 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958) (communications made in con-
nection with administration of the Unemployment Compensation Act, FLA. STAT. § 443.16
(3), are absolutely privileged); Barton v. Rogers, 21 Idaho 609, 123 P. 478 (1912) (pub-
lications of Board of Trustees of an independent school district acting within scope of offi-
cial duty are absolutely privileged); Haskell v. Perkins, 165 Ill. App. 144 (1911) (com-
munications between public officials pertaining to their duties are absolutely privileged.); San-
ford v. Howard, 185 Oki. 660, 95 P.2d 644 (1939) (oral report of misconduct made in com-
pliance with Board of Regents' request was absolutely privileged).
36. See, e.g., Catron v. Jasper, 303 Ky. 598, 198 S.W.2d 322 (1946); Montgomery v.
City of Phila., 392 Pa. 178, 140 A.2d 100 (1958).
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State courts have held that the absolute privilege is available in a
series of cases involving a sheriff, 7 members of a district school board, 88
a borough president, 9 a building inspector, 40 a city architect,41 officials
of a county health department, 42 members of a city council,
4 a mayor,44
a president of a state university,45 and a state highway commissioner. 46
The tests applied by state courts have varied in their emphasis. It
appears that greater reliance has been placed upon whether the executive
official's act or statement was "within his jurisdiction" or within the
scope of an official duty rather than on the indeterminate ground of high
rank.47 More recently, state courts appear to have followed the rule
established in the Barr decision and have discredited high rank as a
valid standard.48
Statements made during proceedings of city councils or city com-
missions have on rare occasions been shielded by an absolute privilege
on the ground that the council or commission proceedings are quasi-
legislative in character, so as to be considered a delegated extension
of the state legislative power, and are therefore held to partake of the
absolute privilege accorded to statements made in the state legislature.49
However, in the majority of such cases, 0 absolute privilege has been
extended on the ground that the statement pertained to the duties of the
members of the council in the proper conduct of their official business, or
that it had a "reasonable relationship" to the subject of the meeting."'
In certain jurisdictions, city and county executive public officials
37. Catron v. Jasper, supra note 36.
38. Barton v. Rogers, supra note 35.
39. Sheridan v. Crisona, 14 N.Y.2d 108, 249 N.Y.S.2d 161, 198 N.E.2d 359 (1964).
40. Montgomery v. City of Phila., supra note 36.
41. Ibid.
42. Powers v. Vaughan, 312 Mich. 297, 20 N.W.2d 196 (1945).
43. Bolton v. Walker, 197 Mich. 699, 164 N.W. 420 (1917).
44. Trebilcock v. Anderson, 117 Mich. 39, 75 N.W. 129 (1898).
45. Hughes v. Bizzeil, 189 Okla. 472, 117 P.2d 763 (1941).
46. Adams v. Tatsch, 68 N.M. 446, 362 P.2d 984 (1961).
47. See supra note 36.
48. See, e.g., Sheridan v. Crisona, supra note 39, at 362, 249 N.Y.S.2d, at 166.
To the grant of absolute privilege to Borough President of Queens in New York
City, Dye, J. dissented: "[B]y a decisional law this court is extending an absolute
immunity for defamatory statements made in their official duties, a privilege never
heretofore enjoyed by that group of officials."
Contra, Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio 574, 37 N.E.2d 584 (1941). The court held that
absolute privilege was available to appointees of the Governor as being within the "official
acts of the chief executive officers of state or nation."
49. Tanner v. Gault, 20 Ohio App. 243, 244, 153 N.E. 124, 125 (1925) (dictum);
Carter v. Jackson, 10 Utah 2d 284, 351 P.2d 957 (1960). The rule of absolute privilege
extends to "the proceedings of all legislative bodies, state or municipal."
50. Larson v. Doner, 32 Ill. App. 2d 471, 472, 178 N.E.2d 399, 401 (1961). "[Tlhe
rule that publication of defamatory matter in the due course of legislative proceedings is
absolutely privileged is broad and comprehensive and includes all such proceedings, whether
federal, state or municipal."
51. Larson v. Doner, supra note 50; Carter v. Jackson, supra note 49.
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have been denied an absolute privilege.52 Despite admissions by the
courts that the act or publication took place on a privileged occasion,5
the grant of privilege has been intentionally restricted to a qualified
one.54 In Mills v. Denny,5" the court stated that the
qualified privilege adequately protects such public officials who
in good faith make bona fide statements .... Such immunity is
sufficient for of itself it abrogates the rule that every defam-
atory publication implies malice.56
There are those who fear that the strong policy considerations that
have created the rule of absolute privilege for federal employees,57 and
which have been responsible for the trend toward absolute immunity
for state officials, may be misapplied at the city and county level.58
Advocates of the restrictive view urge that the individual's right to the
safeguards of legal redress for malicious destruction of his reputation
by unscrupulous and irresponsible local officials is a sacred right. In
these jurisdictions, it is urged that absolute immunity be confined to cases
where there is ultimate supervision and control of local executive officials
by other authorities.59
Florida precedent for absolute privilege has been restricted to judi-
cial proceedings ° and to a single statutory immunity.6 In one Florida
52. Gray v. Mossman, 88 Conn. 247, 90 Atl. 938 (1917). (National Guard officer);
McClendon v. Cloverdale, 203 A.2d 815 (Del. 1964) (member of city council); Mills v.
Denny, 245 Iowa 584, 63 N.W.2d 222 (1954) (mayor and member of city council); How-
land v. Flood, 160 Mass. 509, 36 N.E. 482 (1894); Peterson v. Steenerson, 113 Minn. 87,
129 N.W. 147 (1910) (local district postmaster).
53. See, e.g., Schlinkert v. Henderson, 331 Mich. 284, 287, 49 N.W.2d 180, 183 (1951).
[a] privileged occasion is an occasion when the public good and in the interests of
society one is freed from liability that would otherwise be imposed on him by
reason of the publication of defamatory matter.
54. Supra note 52.
55. Supra note 52.
56. Supra note 52, at 593. The rationale is advanced that an executive who acts in good
faith has adequate protection under the law with a qualified privilege. If he does not act in
good faith he is a danger to the community, and it is morally indefensible that he be im-
mune from suit. In fact, the fear is that the grant of power of absolute privilege is so
great that it may encourage abuse.
57. See, e.g., Glass v. Ickes, supra note 16.
58. This fear is clarified in such cases as Mills v. Denny, supra note 52.
59. Concurring in Glass v. Ickes, supra note 16, at 282, Groner, J. said:
[I] express with great deference the fear that in this and previous cases we may
have extended the rule beyond the reasons out of which it grew and thus unwittingly
created a privilege so extensive as to be almost unlimited and altogether subversive
of the fundamental principle that no man in this country is so high that he is above
the law.
His statements were directed to a case involving a federal official of cabinet rank; never-
theless, the reasoning appears to be particularly appropriate to the question of the ac-
countability of city and county officials.
60. Ryon v. Shaw, 77 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1955). (A report by members of a grand jury
was libelous. The court held that jurors, in performance of their duty, are privileged to
publish defematory matter, if related to the cause. As to the immunity attached to legisla-
tive proceedings, Fisher v. Payne, 93 Fla. 1085, 113 So. 378 (1927) findings reported by
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case, absolute privilege was extended to the proceedings conducted by a
quasi-judicial adminstrative officer, who was required to exercise a "pure
judicial power." 2 Barring these exceptions, the only privilege heretofore
recognized by Florida courts has been the qualified one. "To be privi-
leged, the communication must be by, and to, one who has a right, duty
or interest in the subject."6"
The principal case is one of first impression in Florida. In ruling
that absolute privilege is available to a county manager acting within
the scope of his employment, the court adopted the federal position
enunciated in Barr v. Matteo.64 In addition, the test of high rank was
scorned as a distinction without meaning. The court based its decision
firmly on the ground of policy by asserting the "desirability . . .of ex-
tending to the executive branch at all levels the same immunity that has
for ages been accorded the legislative and judicial branches." 5 Current
Florida law on the subject of absolute privilege of executive public offi-
cials as a defense against defamation committed within the scope of their
duties has been afforded both by the clear guidelines of settled law,""
and through the medium of the McNayr case. This decision will permit
the executive public official to do his job unfettered by the fear of ex-
pensive and time-consuming litigation. It is hoped that an enlightened
electorate can act to restrain abuses of the privilege.
ROBERT BAKERMAN
functionary appointed by court of competent jurisdiction are absolutely privileged). See,
Coogler v. Rhodes, 38 Fla. 240, 21 So. 109 (1897), which clarified absolute privilege with
reference to words spoken or written in certain legislative and judicial proceedings.
61. FLA. STAT. § 443.16(3) (1965) Privileged communications: All letters, reports,
communications, or any other matters either oral or written, from the employer
or employee to each other or to the commission or any of its agents, representa-
tives or employees which shall have been written, sent, delivered, or made in
connection with the requirements and administration of this chapter, shall be
absolutely privileged and shall not be made the subject matter or basis for any
suit for slander or libel in any court of the State of Florida.
See Greene v. Hoiriis, 103 So.2d 226 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958) for application of this statute.
62. Robertson v. Industrial Ins. Co., 75 So.2d 198 (Fla. 1954).
63. Leonard v. Wilson, 150 Fla. 503, 505, 8 So.2d 12, 14 (1942).
64. Supra note 16.
65. McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So.2d 428, 429 (Fla. 1966) (Emphasis added.).
66. See Saxon v. Knowles, 185 So.2d 193 (Fla. 4th Dist 1966), for the Florida case
first citing the principal case as precedent. Saxon held that an executive government official
(city manager) is to be granted absolute immunity for defamatory publications made in-
tentionally or negligently in connection with the performance of the duties and respon-
sibilities of his office.
